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BOOK REVIEWS 
On a COlllplex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas' Philo-
sophical Theology, by Christopher M. Hughes. (Cornell Studies in the Philos-
ophy of Religion) Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989. Pp. xi + 
281. $34.95. 
NORMAN KRETZMANN and TIMOTHY O'CONNOR, Cornell University. 
A prospective reader, noting this book's subtitle and catching glimpses of its 
nearly four hundred references to Aquinas's writings, might reasonably be 
led to expect another contribution to the vast scholarly literature on Aquinas. 
But the book turns out to contain exactly one stray reference to the literature 
(p. 26, n. 23), and Hughes no more intends to contribute to traditional Aquinas 
scholarship than to draw on it. His stated agenda-"to cross-pollinate medi-
evaland contemporary ideas" (p. x)-leads him to engage as directly as 
possible with Aquinas's mind, treating the thirteenth-century theologian as a 
respected contemporary or recent predecessor whose positions one frequently 
opposes. Hughes on Aquinas is less like Gilson on Aquinas than like Ockham 
on Scotus. 
Engaging historically remote philosophers in argument is just what makes 
philosophical scholarship philosophical. As for the scholarly side of the en-
terprise, Hughes's command of Aquinas's texts is impressive, and his Latinity 
is excellent; but his book disappoints some other scholarly expectations. The 
general index is incomplete and unreliable, and the value of the wide-ranging 
references to Aquinas's writings would have been enhanced by an index 
locorum. 1 Most importantly, his policy of ignoring the scholarly literature 
and much of the relevant contemporary literature in philosophical theology 
leads to discussions that are drastically narrowed and isolated in a way that 
reduces the practical value of Hughes's abundant philosophical talent. 
His style is intense but engaging. The book has the tone of a brilliant, utterly 
unstilted talk, addressed to any philosopher conversant with the analytic 
tradition and willing to take seriously the metaphysical issues associated with 
the theses Hughes extracts from the core of Aquinas's philosophical theology. 
Because Hughes's critical assessments of those theses are often at least as 
acute and deep as any on record, Aquinas's defenders and philosophers work-
ing in the tradition of classical philosophical theology must consider them 
carefully. The challenge posed by Hughes's analysis might well prompt new 
departures in philosophical scholarship in those areas. 
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Hughes has divided his book into two parts, "The God of the Philosophers" 
(three chapters on simplicity; one on knowledge, change, and contingency in 
God) and "The God of Faith" (two chapters on trinity, one on incarnation). 
The division reflects Aquinas's own contention that some truths about God 
can be discovered by unaided reason and thus belong to natural theology, 
while other doctrines-paradigmatically trinity and incarnation-must be ini-
tially acquired through revelation. But Hughes's primary purpose in thus 
dividing his book is to use the division as a representation of his main 
conclusion: that God's absolute simplicity, the doctrine at the center of 
Aquinas's natural theology, is incompatible with the revealed doctrines of 
trinity and incarnation. That conclusion may seem trite: anyone who puts 
simplicity together with trinity and incarnation is bound to acknowledge at 
least an apparent incompatibility. But the details of Hughes's conclusion and 
his inferential route to it are certainly not such as would occur to just anyone. 
Aquinas thinks he can show that God is absolutely simple, without com-
position of any sort (SulIlma theologiae [ST] la.3.7). Hughes notes (pp. 3-4) 
sjx specific theses Aquinas introduces on his way to this claim-i.e., God is 
not composed of (1) extended parts, (2) form and matter, (3) act and potency 
(and is consequently absolutely immutable and atemporal), (4) God's essence 
and God himself, (5) subject and attributes (and is consequently the same as 
his attributes, which are consequently the same as one another), (6) essence 
and esse (existence).2 
According to Hughes, Aquinas claims that "(1)-(5) all follow from (6),"3 
and so (6) is "one of the most central" claims Aquinas makes about God (p. 
4). Accordingly, Hughes devotes a long first chapter to a discussion of (6), 
which he equates with 'God is existence itself (ipsum esse).' He begins by 
announcing that he doesn't "know how to construe Aquinas' claim that God 
is ipsllm esse in such a way that it fails to come out necessarily false" (p. 5). 
The first half of Chapter I contains his evidence for the necessary falsity 
of the claim. The core of the evidence is his observation that it is impossible 
for anything's nature to consist of "pure subsistent existence." The observa-
tion does look undeniable: "nothing subsistent could be just existent: a merely 
existent substance is too thin to be possible" (p. 21). But in the very passage 
Hughes cites as the source for his claim that Aquinas confers a special logical 
status on the thesis that God is existence itself, Aquinas himself introduces 
the thesis as a version of 'God is form itself.' On that basis alone it seems 
clear that not even Aquinas would want to deny the observation; nor would 
he say, as Hughes puts it, that "God will be nothing more than existent" (p. 
21; see also pp. 7-8). Furthermore, the textual context from which Hughes 
draws Aquinas's 'God is iPSlllll esse' makes it even clearer that Hughes's 
bare-bones interpretation of iPSlllll esse as pure subsistent existence unfairly 
prejudices his assessment of divine simplicity. 
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Eventually, Hughes comes close to acknowledging that Aquinas would not 
accept as part of his view the absurd thesis that God is nothing but pure 
subsistent existence (p. 22). But by that point the reader is likely to have 
received the misimpression that the basic thesis of Aquinas's concept of 
simplicity has already been shown to be necessarily false or, at best, hope-
lessly muddled on Aquinas's own understanding of it, and that it is only the 
author's patience and respect for Aquinas's philosophical stature that leads him 
even to consider Aquinas's attempts to argue for the already repudiated (6). 
Hughes organizes Aquinas's many, widely scattered arguments for (6) into 
five sorts, devoting most of his attention to the first of them, "the argument 
from the nature of composites" [ANC] (p. 28): If God's essence is distinct 
from his existence, then God is composite; if anything is composite, it is c; 
God could not be c; .'. God's essence is not distinct from his existence. As 
our variable 'c' is intended to indicate, ANC is really a family of arguments. The 
member of the family we will take as representative of ANC is the one in which 
'c' is replaced with 'posterior to and dependent on its/his components.' 
Hughes begins his evaluation of ANC by trying to specify the precise sense 
of priority/posteriority Aquinas intends in his brief presentations of it (at, 
e.g., ST Ia.3.7c and SCG 1.18). Hughes discerns four senses he thinks need 
consideration, but we think it's clear that in ANC Aquinas intends what 
Hughes calls the "causal" sense: "what makes or causes something to exist 
is prior to the thing caused to exist (whether the causation in question is 
efficient, final, or ... formal)" (p. 32). Here is Hughes's evaluation of this 
version of ANC: 
"Why should we suppose that God could not be causally posterior to some 
(proper) part of Him? If it seems obvious that He could not, this is probably 
because we have in mind a much narrower conception of cause than the one 
relevant here. All it means to say that God is causally posterior to one of His 
parts is that there is some constituent of God (distinct from God) whereby 
God is a certain way (existent, divine, wise, vel cetera). How do we know 
this is false? I think Aquinas would answer that if God existed or was a certain 
way, because He had a certain kind of proper part, He would have composi-
tion of act and potency; and if He had composition of act and potency, he 
would be causally dependent on something outside of Him." (pp. 35-38) 
Hughes thus sees this version of ANC as dependent on another of the five 
sorts of supporting arguments, the one he designates "the argument from act 
and potency" [AAP] (p. 29) and later rejects. Aquinas, however, considers 
ANC and AAP to be independent arguments. Moreover, there is a simpler 
basis on which to infer that God could not be "causally" posterior to anything 
other than himself: dependent posteriority of that sort would compromise 
God's aseity.4 
Given Aquinas's Aristotelian conception of properties, even if God were 
composite, the form of, say, perfect goodness wouldn't be ontologically prior 
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to or independent of God. Still, there seems to be a sense in which it would 
be true to say in this connection that God's existence and his being what he 
is are dependent on something he himself did not bring about-viz., his 
having the form of perfect goodness. It isn't obvious to us that this funda-
mental difficulty could be avoided without introducing absolute simplicity, 
and Hughes's failure to resolve the difficulty convincingly and to investigate 
its relationship with simplicity leaves an important gap in his attempt to show 
that the arguments Aquinas offers in support of simplicity lack cogency.s 
A famously counter-intuitive thesis of absolute simplicity is the claim, fully 
endorsed by Aquinas, that all the various perfections we attribute to God are 
really one and the same in him-Le., that God's goodness = God's power = 
God's wisdom, etc. ((5) above). These properties are obviously not the same 
in general: the good are often powerless, the powerful are even more often 
not good, and so on. Might God's perfect goodness nevertheless be the same 
as God's perfect power in virtue of being the same as God?6 This way of 
handling thesis (5) is, perhaps surprisingly, not one that Hughes finds trou-
blesome. Instead, as he sees it, "The problem is that if God has the attribute 
of perfect goodness (or perfect wisdom), then a fortiori God has the attribute 
of goodness (or wisdom) .... And even if the attributes of perfect goodness 
and perfect wisdom are had by God alone, the attributes of goodness and 
wisdom are shared by God and creatures .... [But] if God's goodness is an 
attribute He shares with creatures, then it cannot be an insular attribute, and 
thus cannot be identical to God" (pp. 67-68). 
Hughes recognizes that many will be inclined to respond to this problem 
by appealing to Aquinas's view that properties are predicated of both God 
and creatures only analogically, pointing out that the problem generated here 
depends on their being univocally predicated (p. 69). But, Hughes replies, 
Aquinas bases his view that such predication is analogical on the doctrine 
that God, very unlike creatures, is not distinct from his existence or any of 
his attributes-a doctrine that Hughes takes himself to have shown to be 
unfounded. His project in Chapter 2 is thus in this respect dependent on the 
alleged result of Chapter I. But if the doubts we raised above deserve con-
sideration, Hughes's project in Chapter 1 is inconclusive; and its inconclu-
siveness undercuts to some extent the project of Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, in a suggestive, potentially illuminating discussion Hughes 
goes on to propose that even if the thesis that God is not distinct from any 
of his attributes had to be given up, much of the motivation for it might be 
satisfied by reconstruing it in terms of strong supervenience. He then suggests 
that we recast simplicity thesis (5) as (5+): Wisdom, power, goodness, and 
all the rest of God's intrinsic attributes are 'nothing over and above,' or 
'consist in'-that is, have as a supervenience base-the simple but superrich 
attribute that is the divine essence" (p. 82). 
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The most damaging philosophical objection to divine simplicity, in 
Hughes's view, is the one he presents in Chapter 4 in the form of a simple 
argument: "since God is essentially omniscient, at every possible world, He 
knows whatever is true at that world. Because different things are true at 
different worlds, what God knows must vary from world to world. Knowl-
edge, whatever else it involves, involves belief:? so God's beliefs vary from 
world to world. But if God's beliefs vary from world to world, so too must 
his intrinsic properties" (p. 108). 
Hughes considers (pp. 110-13) basing a reply to this objection on some 
examples of Tyler Burge's that seem to show that there may be variation 
across worlds in an individual's beliefs while his intrinsic properties remain 
constant. The resultant suggestion would be that God's mental state is intrin-
sically the same in all possible worlds, and that his beliefs vary only as a 
consequence of a purely relational property obtaining between God and w, 
for each world W.B We think Hughes is right to reject this strategy. It involves 
an implausible notion of belief and a mistaken assessment of the requirements 
of the doctrine of simplicity. In our view, a more promising way of dealing 
with this objection would be to discard Hughes's assumption that Aquinas's 
position entails God's being the same in all possible worlds.9 
In Part II of his book Hughes examines Aquinas's attempt to reconcile 
divine simplicity with trinity and incarnation. He mounts a two-pronged 
attack, arguing (a) that both Aquinas's account of trinity and his account of 
incarnation are internally inconsistent Uust because, Hughes suggests, 
Aquinas tries to reconcile each of them with his account of simplicity), and 
(b) that while an orthodox account of trinity might be reconciled with 
Hughes's own versions of simplicity interpreted in terms of supervenience, 
incarnation cannot be reconciled with even that version of simplicity. 
Hughes begins Part II with a chapter-length consideration of whether trinity 
is provably inconsistent, given its inclusion of these three claims: "( 1) There 
are exactly three divine persons. (2) Each divine person is God. (3) There is 
exactly one God" (p. 153). He helpfully distinguishes "the way of analysis" 
and "the way of analogy" by which medieval philosopher-theologians tried 
to rebut charges of inconsistency in (1)-(3) (p. 156). The former involves 
restating the propositions of trinity in metaphysical terms and defending the 
consistency of the restated claims; the latter involves pointing to actual 
(hence consistent) structures and arrangements in the world that resemble 
those that figure in trinity. 
In attempting to show that (l )-(3) need not be construed as inconsistent, 
Hughes very ingeniously employs his own blend of these approaches. But for 
two reasons the result is bound to be perceived as offering no help for the 
traditional doctrine. First, it requires taking God's mode of existence to be 
temporal; second, and even more troublesomely, it requires conceiving of 
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each of the divine persons as having "layered parts." Of course, Hughes 
knows his solution looks unorthodox. He admits that the idea that "the divine 
persons and God have a plurality of parts .. .is a surprising one, which would 
have been denounced not just by Anselm, but by Augustine, Aquinas, and the 
whole pantheon of medieval philosophical theology. There is, however, a 
difference between the tenets of medieval Christian philosophers and the 
tenets of the Christian faith .... Similarly, I don't think the view that God and 
the divine persons are temporal and mutable is heterodox, even if it was very 
unpopular with (Christian) medieval philosophical theologians" (pp. 181-82). 
His position here challenges the basis of some recent work in philosophical 
theology, and the challenge needs to be addressed carefully in the long-range 
response Hughes's book deserves. But since a theory of trinity in terms of 
"thing-stuff-co-composition" (pp. 178-80) could not even make contact with 
Aquinas's philosophical theology, its development in this book strikes us as 
misplaced. 
The notion of relative identity has recently attracted the attention of some 
philosophers (Peter Geach, most notably) as a basis for explicating trinity, 
enabling one to maintain consistently that, e.g., the Father is not the same 
person as the Son although he is the very same God as the Son. Hughes 
recognizes the relative-identity approach as a rival to his thing-stuff-co-com-
position account, and he dismisses it, mainly on the basis of two considera-
tions. First, alleged non-theological instances of relative identity are 
unconvincing. We tend to agree, but it's conceivable that sortally-relativized 
identity may be instantiated only in the special context of trinity. Hughes's 
second consideration is distilled in his suggestion that "(on anyone's account) 
certain inferences of the form 'a has the property P, a is the same K as b, 
therefore b has the property P' are valid. Someone [viz., a relative-identity 
theorist] who thinks that some but not all inferences having this form are 
valid owes us an explanation of just when they are" (p. 158). But why does 
Hughes assume that a relative-identity theorist will accept any such inference 
as valid? Any rational person who maintains that in at least one case a 
statement employing such a relative-identity predicate as 'is the same God 
as' is true, while the corresponding claim of absolute identity is false, will 
certainly refuse to make it part of the logic of any such predicate that it entails 
the indiscernibility of the relata. Of course, one may suppose (as a metaphys-
ical thesis) that, e.g., for any x and y, if 'x is the same dog as y' is true, then 
x and yare indiscernible with respect to any property-and, hence, that if 'x 
is brown' is also known to be true, then one may validly infer that 'y is brown' 
is true. But anyone who supposed this and espoused a relative-identity ac-
count of trinity would insist that the inference holds partly in virtue of the 
meaning of 'dog' in a natural language. Its "validity" cannot be a feature of 
the formal language because, the relative-identity trinitarian would maintain, 
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at least one instantiation of the general schema 'x is P, x is the same K as y; 
therefore, y is P' will take you from truth to falsity. We think relative identity 
offers a strategy that merits more consideration than Hughes gives it. 10 
When Hughes turns (in Chapter 6) from his own and others' alternative 
accounts of trinity to Aquinas's, he begins by noting that it is developed on 
the twofold basis of an examination of God's understanding (or intellect) and 
God's will. Hughes's own "focus is on Aquinas' account of how divine un-
derstanding gives rise to a plurality of divine persons, rather than on his 
account of how the divine will does" (p. 188). The elements of Aquinas's 
approach via the divine intellect may be seen in the following passage (SCG 
IVII [no 3473]), which Hughes does not cite: 
Now it belongs to the nature of an interior word, which is an understood 
concept (illlelltio), that it proceeds from the one who understands, in accord 
with his act of understanding, since it is, so to speak, the terminus of the 
intellect's operation. For the intellect in understanding conceives and forms 
the understood concept or idea (ratio), which is the interior word. Therefore, 
God's Word must proceed from God, in accord with his own act of under-
standing. Therefore, God's Word is related to the understanding God whose 
Word it is as to him from whom it is; for that [relationship] is part of the 
nature of a word. Therefore, although in God's case the one who is under-
standing, the act of understanding, and the understood concept or the Word 
are one in essence, and although it is consequently necessary that each of 
those is God, there nevertheless remains a relational distinction only, in 
keeping with the way the Word is related to the one who conceives as to the 
one from whom it is. 
It is essential to Aquinas's account of trinity that such intra-trinitarian 
relationships are real, not merely conceptual. Moreover, they must distinguish 
and even constitute the divine persons. 
The difficulties apparent in those claims might strike many as providing 
grounds enough on which to dismiss the account, but Hughes, characteristi-
cally and admirably, begins his critique by providing a means of making sense 
of what may seem incoherent. Hughes argues in support of Aquinas's con-
tention that there can be individual substances discernible only with respect 
to relational (and haecceitistic) properties. lI But then his doubts emerge: 
"What new supposition do we make when we say [as Aquinas says concerning 
the divine persons] that the distinctness of those substances is not just entailed 
by, but also grounded in, their discernibility with respect to relational prop-
erties? I don't know .... I'm not saying: it is necessarily false that relational 
facts not only entail the distinctness of a pair of incomposite individuals, but 
also ground that distinctness. But I do think there is a puzzle about what it 
could be like for the proposition in question to be true" (p. 206). It seems to 
us, however, that no new supposition is called for. A relational distinction 
formed around a real, asymmetric relationship (such as generation) entails 
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different relational properties in the two relata, and it seems arguable that 
that additional entailment might well count as showing that the distinctness 
of the persons is grounded in the relationship.12 
Hughes's final criticism of Aquinas's philosophical theology is that incar-
nation entails composition within the second person and so is incompatible 
with simplicity. He thinks the following simple argument establishes the 
claim: "if the Word is God, and if whatever is God is immutable and atempo-
ral, then the Word is immutable and atemporal. In that case, if the Word is 
the very same hypostasis or individual as Jesus Christ, then Jesus Christ is 
immutable and atemporal. Now, we know that Jesus Christ 'began to fear and 
be weary' ... [But] if an individual was first less fearful, and then more 
fearful, ... that individual must be different intrinsically from the way he 
was-and any individual who is different intrinsically than he was is both 
temporal and mutable" (pp. 253-54). 
Aquinas's rejoinder to this argument would, naturally, be based on a dis-
tinction between what may be predicated, on the one hand, of Christ qua 
human and, on the other, of Christ qua divine. Now Hughes appears to agree 
that such a distinction provides a sufficient basis on which to refute the charge 
that incarnation is incoherent because it licenses attributing contradictory 
predicates to the same individual. But, he argues, that is not enough to save 
simplicity; for it remains true that the individual God the Word went from 
being less-fearful-natured to being more-fearful-natured, and hence changed. 
'''God the Word changes' comes out true, because God the Word has the 
attribute changing, and 'God the Word is atemporal and immutable' comes 
out true, because God the Word's divine nature (but not God the Word) is 
atemporal and immutable" (p. 260). But in that case we are forced to say 
what Aquinas would certainly want not to say, that "God the Word is a 
changing individual one of whose natures is timeless and unchangeable" 
(ibid. ). 
One option available to Aquinas here is suggested by Hughes: "when the 
Word goes from being less-fearful-natured to being more-fearful-natured, the 
Word does not really change, because the assumed nature that undergoes a 
real change shares no parts with the assuming Word. (More precisely, nothing 
that is ever a part of the assumed nature is ever a part of the assuming Word.)" 
(p. 261). But we're inclined to agree with Hughes in thinking that if the 
human nature assumed by the Word is disjoint from the Word in this way, 
then the claim that it is the Words human nature seems untenable. 
We have criticized Hughes's neglect of some of the amenities of scholarship 
and his ignoring of the relevant literature. Without those shortcomings his 
book would have been sounder, but it would probably also have been less 
exciting. With an unusually keen eye, Hughes has taken a fresh look at those 
old texts. His interpretation of what he's seen should not be readily accepted 
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by anyone who has an interest in understanding Aquinas, but it certainly must 
be carefully considered. Our rapid survey cannot convey the subtlety, com-
plexity, and novelty of his exploration. With this book Hughes earns the 
respectful attention of every student of Aquinas's philosophical theology.13 
NOTES 
1. The book is generally attractive and well-produced, as one expects Cornell Press 
books to be. But we did find nearly a hundred typographical or substantive mistakes, many 
more than we expected. Here are some of the more important ones: 28.18 [uninterpretable 
reference to "quaestiones"]; 45.7: the esse/the essence; 91.13b: essence/individual es-
sence; 126.3: equivalent/inequivalent; 129.n22: DV/DP; 134.17b: (i)/(ii); 195.17: by b,/by 
a,. 
2. Hughes omits without comment a seventh such thesis: that God is not composed of 
genus and differentia (ST la.3.5 and 7c). 
3. His only reference here is "see, e.g., ST la.3.7, responsio," presumably this sentence 
in particular: "Thus, since God is form itself or, rather, esse itself (ipS/lIIl esse), he cannot 
be composed in any way." Perhaps (6) 'God is not composed of essence and esse' may be 
identified with 'God is ipS/WI esse,' and the passage does suggest that 'God is ipsulII esse' 
or 'God is ipsa forma' may be taken to be the basis of the doctrine of absolute simplicity. 
Notice, however, that (4) seems as nearly identical with 'God is ipsa forllla' as (6) does 
with 'God is ipS/lIIl esse,' an observation that casts some doubt on Hughes's claim about 
the special logical status of (6). 
4. Later (p. 50) Hughes does consider this way of posing the difficulty but also expresses 
doubts about the strong version of aseity required here. 
5. Even in view of Hughes's attending only to recent philosophical literature it is 
surprising that he takes no account of such discussions of the relationship between 
simplicity and aseity as Alvin Plantinga's Aquinas Lecture, Does God Have a Nature? 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), William Mann's "Simplicity and Immu-
tability in God" (International Philosophical Quarterly 23 [1983], pp. 267-76), and 
Thomas Morris's "Dependence and Divine Simplicity" (International Journal for the 
Philosophy of Religioll23 [1988], pp. 161-74. 
6. For some discussion of this issue, see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 
"Absolute Simplicity" (Faith and Philosophy 2 [1985], pp. 353-82), pp. 354-57. 
7. Some contemporary philosophers would disagree (see esp. William P. Alston, "Does 
God Have Beliefs?," Religious Studies 22 (1987), pp. 287-306). See also Hughes'S own 
remarks on p. 115. 
8. A similar move is suggested by E. Zemach and D. Widerker in "Facts, Freedom, and 
Foreknowledge," Religious Studies 23 (1988), pp. 19-28. 
9. For some development of this strategy, see Stump and Kretzmann, "Absolute Sim-
plicity" (n. 10 above), pp. 367-71. 
10. The most promising development of this approach we know of is Peter van 
Inwagen's "And Yet There Are Not Three Gods But One God" in T. Morris, ed., Philos-
BOOK REVIEWS 535 
ophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 
241-78. 
11. He is drawing on a discussion by Max Black in "The Identity of Indiscernibles" in 
his Problems of Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 80-92 (to which 
Hughes provides no reference). The fact that Black's example is of a world containing 
only two qualitatively alld relatiollally indiscernible spheres seems to make it inappropri-
ate for Hughes's purpose here: "We might suppose that each was made of chemically pure 
iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same temperature, color, and so on, and 
that nothing else existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of the one would 
also be a property of the other" (p. 83). 
12. Hughes comes close to admitting this when he says "the Father and the Son are 
discernible, ill that the Son is generated by the Father and the Father is not" (p. 214; 
emphasis added). 
13. We are grateful to Christopher Hughes for corresponding with us about some of the 
issues in his book. 
Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, by 
Lee Yearley. Volume Two in the series, "Toward a Comparative Philosophy 
of Religions," Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, editors. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1990. Pp. xiv and 280. 16.95 (paper). 
JEAN PORTER, University of Notre Dame 
In his introduction, Frank Reynolds describes the aim of the series, "Towards 
a Comparative Philosophy of Religions," as "the development of a new kind 
of comparative philosophy of religions that is global in its perspective and 
in tune with contemporary philosophical developments and issues" (xi). At 
least some of the philosophical developments to which Reynolds refers have 
made this a daunting task indeed. In particular, the growing consensus 
against epistemological foundationalism has raised questions as to whether 
it is possible genuinely to understand, much less to assess, intellectual and 
moral traditions radically different from the observer's own. Seen in this 
light, earlier efforts to spell out a universal core of beliefs and values embed-
ded within the world's great religions are likely to appear as drastic oversim-
plifications at best, distorting projections of the observer's own convictions 
at the worst. 
And yet, it is hard to know what alternative we have. We could follow the 
example of those anthropologists who offer detailed "thick" descriptions of 
the traditions of other societies, without attempting to identify any common 
ground between them and us. But while this approach avoids the pitfalls of 
a false universalism, it does not offer much in the way of a basis for dialogue 
among those who have been formed in disparate traditions. And given the 
